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Abstract 
 
We investigate the determinants of net interest margins of Indonesian banks after the 
1997/1998 financial crisis. Using data for 93 Indonesian banks over the 2001-2009 period, 
we estimate an econometric model using a pooled regression as well as static and dynamic 
panel regressions. Our results confirm that the structure of loan portfolios matters in the 
determination of interest margins. Operating costs, market power, risk aversion and liquidity 
risk have positive impacts on interest margins, while credit risk and cost to income ratio are 
negatively associated with margins. Our results also corroborate the loss leader hypothesis on 
cross-subsidization between traditional interest activities and non-interest activities. State-
owned banks set higher interest margins than other banks, while margins are lower for large 
banks and for foreign banks. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely known that the average net interest margin, the difference between interest 
income and expenses divided by interest-earning assets, of Indonesian banks is relatively 
higher than those observed in other countries particularly in the East Asia region (Rosengard 
and Prasetyantoko, 2011). A number of cross country studies point out this fact. Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga (1998) show that the average margins of Indonesian banks for the 1988-
1995 period was 3.6%, higher than those of neighboring countries such as Singapore (2.2%), 
and Malaysia (2.7%). Using data after the 1997/1998 financial crisis from 1999 to 2008, 
López-Espinosa et al. (2011) show that, in Indonesia, average bank interest margins (4.85%) 
were much higher than, for example, the average interest margins of Japanese banks (1.92%). 
Recently, Lin et al. (2012) have indicated that with a value of 6.36% the average bank margin 
of Indonesian banks over the 1997-2005 period, was the highest compared to other Asian 
countries in their sample
2
. Their work also shows that the interest margin of Indonesian banks 
is significantly higher after the 1997/1998 crisis than before
3
.   
The present paper extends the literature on the determinants of net interest margins by 
studying Indonesian banks which have experienced a problem of persistently high net interest 
margins since the 1997/1998 financial crisis. We hypothesize that the persistence of high 
interest margins in Indonesia is affected by a set of simultaneous factors which are the 
structure of loan portfolios, the degree of competition, the level of income diversification, 
cost efficiency, bank size as well as credit risk and liquidity risk. We also assume that net 
interest margins are influenced by bank ownership characteristics. To our knowledge, this 
paper is the first that comprehensively studies the determinants of net interest margins in 
Indonesia after the crisis. We incorporate two unique loan portfolio components, small scale 
loans and property loans, as factors explaining interest margins which contextually matter in 
Indonesia. Studying interest margins with regard to the ownership and governance 
characteristics of banks is also important. Using pooled regression techniques as well as static 
and dynamic panel regressions, we find evidence that the structure of loan portfolios do 
matter in the determination of interest margins. Specifically, small scale loans contribute to 
increase bank margins, whereas housing (property) loans tend to reduce interest margins. 
Also, operating costs, market power, risk aversion and liquidity risk significantly and 
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 We conduct our own computations using data from BankScope for banks in 9 East Asia countries from 2005 to 
2009. The average margin of Indonesian banks is 5.7% far above the 3.03 % on average for the 8 other 
countries.  
3
 López-Espinosa et al. (2011) also show that average interest margins of Indonesian banks have increased over 
their sample period.  
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positively affect margins, while credit risk and cost to income ratio are negatively associated 
with margins. Our results also corroborate the loss leader hypothesis on cross-subsidization 
of lending and non-interest activities. Furthermore, state-owned banks have higher margins 
than other banks, while foreign banks and large banks set lower margins.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous work 
on related issues. In section 3, we provide some background on Indonesian banking. In 
Section 4, we describe our data, variables, and empirical model. Section 5 reports the results 
and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes our findings and provides policy implications. 
 
2. Literature Review 
As financial intermediary institutions, banks collect deposits from surplus spending 
units with an interest cost and distribute it to deficit spending units by charging an interest 
rate. Although high interest margins are associated with inefficiency (Drakos, 2003; Beck and 
Hesse, 2009; López-Espinosa et al., 2011), some studies, however, use interest margins as a 
measure of bank profitability (e.g. Chen and Liao, 2011). The issue of how banks set their 
interest margin has been extensively studied in the literature. In a seminal paper, Ho and 
Saunders (1981) introduce the dealership model in which banks perform as a risk-averse 
intermediary between the demanders and suppliers of funds. Their model posits that positive 
interest margins will prevail as long as banks are risk-averse agents and face uncertainty even 
in a highly competitive market. They conclude that a bank's interest margin is determined by 
four factors: the degree of managerial risk aversion, the size of transactions, market structure, 
and the variance of the market interest rate. Many empirical studies have expanded and 
examined the dealership model using cross-country data or by focusing on a single country in 
the context of developed and developing countries (e.g. Angbazo, 1997; Saunders and 
Schumacher, 2000; Maudos and de Guevara, 2004; Carbó and Rodriguez, 2007; Hawtrey and 
Liang, 2008; Maudos and Solís, 2009; Poghosyan, 2010; Fungáčová and Poghosyan, 2011; 
Lin et al., 2012). The literature has also provided theoretical microeconomic approaches to 
optimal interest margin setting (Allen, 1988; Angbazo, 1997; Maudos and de Guevara, 2004; 
Maudos and Solís, 2009). Another comprehensive study on the determinants of interest 
margins is proposed by Beck and Hesse (2009) enlightening four major perspectives which 
determine interest margins and spread: i) risk-based view concerning the compensation for 
the riskiness of loans, ii) small financial system focuses on the fixed cost component of 
financial service provision and the resulting scale economies, iii) market structure matters for 
competitiveness and ownership structure of the banking market, iv) macroeconomic view 
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reveals that spreads and margins are affected by monetary and exchange rate policies as well 
as economic cycles.    
From a risk-based perspective and in line with previous studies, Beck and Hesse 
(2009) argue that higher risk in bank lending contributes to positively affect margins. Under 
this view, banks will charge a higher risk premium for riskier loans. Subsequently, the level 
of risk compensation may depend on the structure of the loan portfolio. More specifically, in 
the case of a developing country such as Uganda, Beck and Hesse (2009) find that sectoral 
loan portfolio composition of banks influences the variation of margins
4
. In the present paper, 
we consider two types of lending which may significantly contribute to determine interest 
margins. Firstly, like in other developing countries, bank lending to small medium enterprises 
(SMEs) is prevalent in Indonesian banks especially in domestic banks. Loans to SMEs may 
require a higher risk premium because SMEs are more financially constrained than large 
firms and they are relatively opaque (de la Torre et al., 2010) due to weaker or non-existent 
accounting standards (Behr et al., 2011). Moreover, lending to these firms is typically costly 
in the context of Indonesia (Agung et al., 2001). Secondly, we consider that the proportion of 
housing (property) loans could affect the setting of interest margins. As a large market, 
Indonesia has been undergoing consumption-driven economic growth. One of the drivers is 
the growth of housing demand (Hoek-Smit, 2005) which subsequently leads to escalate the 
demand of housing loans. This type of lending is considered as less risky because for each 
loan banks hold the certificate of ownership as collateral with a value that will increase over 
time under normal conditions. Moreover, the policy of the Government of Indonesia to widen 
the access to housing finance for the poor imposes banks to charge a lower rate.     
Ho and Saunders (1981) argue that banks facing relatively inelastic demand and 
supply functions can exercise their monopoly power to set a greater margin. A number of 
empirical studies have examined how market structure and banking competitive conditions 
impact on interest margins
5
. Maudos and de Guevara (2004) find a positive effect of bank 
market power estimated by the Lerner index on interest margins in the banking sectors of the 
European Union. Claeys and Vennet (2008) find that a higher interest margin is associated 
with a higher concentration of the banking industry in Central and Eastern European 
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 Using data of Ugandan banking, they include a number of sectors which are agriculture, mining, 
manufacturing, trade, transportation, construction, and other services. 
5
 There are two widely used methods to measure market structure and its impact on bank margins in the 
literature which are the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) and the Lerner index. However, these two measures 
do not necessarily reflect the same dimension. HHI measures the concentration of the industry, while the Lerner 
index reflects the degree of competition as it measures the ability of a bank to influence the price of products 
and is therefore directly linked to competition (Weill, 2011). 
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countries. Using data of Mexican banks, Maudos and Solís (2009) find that banks with 
greater market power, measured by a Lerner index, have higher interest margins. Following 
the studies of Maudos and de Guevara (2004) and Maudos and Solís (2009), we use the 
Lerner index to represent the degree of competition. Banks having a greater market power are 
supposed to set higher interest margins
6
.  
All around the world banks have now become more diversified in their revenues' 
sources. Deregulation and technological changes have triggered the development of non-
interest activities and reduced the importance of traditional intermediation activities (Lepetit 
et al., 2008; Elsas et al., 2010). Lepetit et al. (2008) test the loss leader hypothesis contending 
that the link between diversification in bank activities and interest margins could be negative 
as banks might be charging a lower lending rate to attract new customers and to build long-
term relationship enabling the sales of services and higher gains from non-interest income 
activities. They empirically test this hypothesis in the context of European banks. Similarly, 
Maudos and Solís (2009) find that diversified banks, i.e. with a higher degree of non-interest 
income, have lower interest margins. Although income diversification is also widespread in 
Indonesian banks, the dependency on traditional banking activities is still prevalent as well
7
.  
We also take into account the efficiency in the production process, bank size, risk 
aversion, credit risk and liquidity risk to explain the persistence of high interest margins in 
Indonesia. We follow the studies of Maudos and de Guevara (2004); Beck and Hesse (2009); 
Maudos and Solís (2009); Fungáčová and Poghosyan (2011) to include operating (overhead) 
costs in the determination of interest margins. Maudos and de Guevara (2004) extend the 
dealership model by including operating costs to represent how efficient banks are in their 
production process. The higher the ratio of operating costs to total assets, the higher the 
interest margins banks set. The other proxy of efficiency is the cost to income ratio which 
also measures the quality of bank management as argued by Maudos and Solís (2009) as this 
ratio reflects a spent cost for a selected asset. They find that this ratio has a negative effect on 
interest margins. Bank size is also included. Some empirical studies find that large banks 
have lower margins because these banks may reach economies of scale enabling them to 
decrease their margins (Fungáčová and Poghosyan, 2011) and they tend to grow in loans 
markets with low margins (Lopez-Espinosa et al., 2011). Beck and Hesse (2009) also argue 
that smaller banks may encounter higher costs and therefore set higher margins. We 
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 We report in the robustness check's section the results obtained with HHI instead of the Lerner index.  
7
 In this paper, we show that the average diversification index is only 0.16 indicating that as a whole, Indonesian 
banks are less diversified than in other countries.  
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incorporate the ratio of equity to total assets which is considered to represent the degree of 
bank risk aversion (Maudos and Solís, 2009; Poghosyan, 2010). In the dealership model, Ho 
and Saunders (1981) explain that higher managerial risk aversion will increase interest 
margins. We follow a number of previous studies which include credit risk as a determinant 
of interest margins. Regarding the effect of credit risk on bank margins, there are two 
competing arguments. On the one hand, banks facing higher credit risk will charge a higher 
risk premium on the loans they grant (Angbazo, 1997; Maudos and de Guevara, 2004; López-
Espinosa et al., 2011). On the other hand, as argued by Fungáčová and Poghosyan (2011) 
risky banks could be punished by depositors in the form of a higher interest rate required on 
deposits implying that margins should be lower for these banks.  Another factor that we 
consider to influence margins is liquidity risk. López-Espinosa et al. (2011) contend that the 
higher opportunity cost of holding reserves as a result of higher liquid assets would decrease 
net interest margins. Similar results are also found in other studies (Maudos and de Guevara, 
2004; Chen and Liao, 2011).  
We also question whether bank interest margins differ across ownership types. Firstly, 
we consider the interest margins of state-owned (government) banks. The role of state-owned 
banks in a banking system has been studied in several perspectives, particularly in the context 
of developing countries in which the behaviors of these banks matter more (Micco et al., 
2007). According to social or development theory of public enterprises, these banks are often 
inefficient because they play a specific role as development agencies. Sometimes they are 
assigned to fund unprofitable government projects. Additionally, labor surplus could also be a 
form of policy burden that should be borne by these banks to help government reduce 
unemployment. Such development roles of these banks may lead them to be more costly and 
in turn set higher interest margins. Another possible difference between state-owned banks 
and private banks regarding margin setting could stem from implicit guarantees and too-big-
to-fail considerations. Depositors may perceive state-owned banks as less risky because they 
believe that the government will rescue them if they face financial problems which mean that 
these banks are perceived to have a larger implicit guarantee (Mondschean and Opiela, 1999). 
Moreover, given that state-owned banks in Indonesia are mostly large banks, the too-big-to-
fail dimension should also be considered. These two factors could lead such banks to charge a 
lower rate on deposits, which ultimately could spread their margins. Secondly, we examine 
whether the interest margins of foreign banks are different from those of other banks. It is 
generally argued that foreign banks in emerging countries have positive economic impacts on 
the host country in terms of resources allocation and higher efficiency (Claessens et al., 
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2001). Having better hard information and technology may lead these banks to perform more 
efficiently than domestic banks.   
Few studies examine the role of ownership in the determination of interest margins
8
. 
Contrary to the common expectation, Drakos (2003), using data of banks in Central and 
Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and the Former Soviet Union countries (FSU), finds 
that state-owned banks typically set lower margins. Martinez-Peria and Mody (2004) show 
that foreign banks in 5 Latin American Countries charge lower interest margins than 
domestic banks. Poghosyan (2010), by considering the dealership approach, finds that foreign 
bank participation does not affect interest margins in Central and Eastern European countries. 
Fungáčová and Poghosyan (2011) find that in Russia, the impact of some interest margins 
determinants differs across state banks, domestic private banks and foreign banks. Though 
the results of previous studies on this issue are inconclusive, the unique feature of the 
Indonesian banking structure is worth be considering in our investigation on the determinants 
of interest margins.      
 
3. Indonesian Banking Post-Financial Crisis 
The 1997/1998 financial crisis has led to severe consequences regarding the 
intermediation function of Indonesian banks. Early after the crisis, the Indonesian banking 
system experienced a credit crunch phenomenon banks being reluctant to grant new loans
9
. 
This credit crunch led to a sharp decrease in intermediation as shown by a lower ratio of 
loans to deposits. Banks then charged a strangling interest rate on loans to cover their 
intermediation costs. The credit crunch was considered as the factor causing the slower 
process of Indonesia’s economic recovery compared to other Asian countries that have 
suffered from the crisis such as South Korea and Thailand (Agung et al., 2001). To accelerate 
the economic recovery, the Government of Indonesia then conducted several policies relying 
on banks as the locomotive given their importance in the financial system
10
. Thus, the 
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 Poghosyan (2010) argues that no theoretical paper has incorporated the role of ownership in the determination 
of interest margins. Moreover, he denotes that any potential impact of ownership, particularly foreign banks 
versus domestic banks, have already been accounted for in the dealership model and its extension.     
9
 The banks' reluctance to grant loans was considered as the result of the excessive bank lending behavior during 
the banking deregulation regime which amplified the impact of the financial crisis. Therefore, banks then 
behaved very carefully in their lending activities. In the aftermath of the crisis, other affected countries in the 
region such as Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, and Philippines also faced the credit crunch problem (Ding et 
al., 1998). Bank credit in Indonesia then continued to grow slowly due to banks being confronted with higher 
credit risk, capital crunch, and lack of information regarding the quality of borrowers (Agung et al., 2001). In 
2001, the average loan to deposit ratio of banks included in our sample was only 54% (more details are provided 
in our descriptive statistics' tables 1 and 2).  
10
 The capital market and other financial intermediation institutions were still relatively underdeveloped.  
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government bolstered banks to improve their intermediation activities. Though several 
improvements in the banking sector have been implemented following the institutional 
reforms and economic recovery, the problem of high interest margins has been a serious 
problem in this country. Regulators have paid a greater attention on this issue by issuing a 
number of regulations to promote healthy competition, to improve market discipline, to boost 
good governance which expectedly could decrease interest margins and subsequently 
improve the efficiency of financial intermediation. Moreover, Bank Indonesia recently 
released a direct regulation on prime lending rate transparency for commercial banks. This 
regulation is intended to promote the transparency of banking products, including their 
benefits, costs and risks. At the primary stage, this regulation is addressed for those having 
assets more than 10 trillion Rupiah.  
Like in other developing countries, the existence of micro, small, and medium 
enterprises (MSMEs) was an important issue in Indonesia
11
 because of their significant 
contribution to the economy in forms work force and output, high priorities given by the 
government, and better response to the harmful 1997/1998 economic crisis (Hill, 2001; 
Hayashi, 2002) even though they faced several problems such as access to capital markets, 
and lack in technology that made them less competitive than others (Najib et al., 2011). As 
the importance of MSMEs in the economy, the government encouraged banks to increase the 
accessibility to financing for MSMEs
12
. In 2001, Bank Indonesia issued a regulation (PBI 
No: 3/2/PBI/2001) on small scale loans stating that banks were recommended to channel 
small scale loans in their lending portfolio
13
. Improving access of MSMEs to credit and 
financing was also highlighted in the implementation plan of the Indonesian Banking 
Architecture (IBA)
14
.   
Following the economic recovery, the Indonesian economy then consistently grew 
majorly driven by consumption. This fourth most populated country in the world faced an 
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 The Indonesia Statistics Bureau released data presenting that in 2007, 99.99 % of business units are micro, 
small, and medium enterprises and they account for 97.3 % of the total workforce in Indonesia (Statistics of 
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises 2007-2008).  
12
 Agung et al. (2001) reveal that lending to SMEs in Indonesia was relatively low risk, however, banks were 
still reluctant to release loans to SMEs due to the fact that loans to these firms were very costly and because 
banks lacked experience in dealing with SMEs. Wattanapruttipaisan (2003) explains the factors causing the 
unsuccessful small and medium enterprises (SMEs) financing in ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, after 
the financial crisis that come from demand and supply sides. In the supply side, banks were reluctant to channel 
loans to SMEs because they would be the major debtor that looks risky even though they could charge a high 
risk premium. 
13
 This regulation defined small scale loan as a bank lending to borrowers for an investment and/or working 
capital (productive purposes) up to 500 million Rupiah.  
14
 In 2004, the government introduced a concept of Indonesian Banking Architecture (IBA), a road map of the 
Indonesian banking sector which would be implemented gradually. 
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escalating housing demand in line with the growth of its population which was one of the 
main growth drivers. Hoek-Smit (2005) points out that the demand for new housing in 
Indonesia is more than 800,000 units per year (3.5 to 3.75 %) which lead the growth in 
housing (mortgage) loans to exceed growth in other types of credit. The government released 
policies to ease the access to housing loans for the poor to reduce the number of homeless 
people and as one of the poverty alleviation programs. The Ministry of Public Housing then 
issued a regulation on the subsidy of housing loans for the poor in form of a lower-fixed 
interest rate.   
Indonesian banking is featured by a number of state-owned banks which are 
distinguished based on which government controls the banks. Regional development banks 
are owned by regional (provincial and district) governments, while state-owned banks are 
controlled by the central government
15
. As public enterprises, these banks are subject to 
government policies. However, they also benefit from funding under the form of deposits 
particularly from small depositors. Two aspects may arise regarding the intermediation cost, 
i) these banks could charge a lower rate for deposits, ii) the inefficiency of these banks could  
increase the overhead costs. Therefore the interest margins of state-owned banks could be 
higher than those of other banks. Another issue regarding bank ownership structure is the 
foreign banks' participation in this industry
16
. In principle, foreign banks’ presence should 
benefit the domestic market since they have a better technology that could lead them to 
perform more efficiently and therefore contribute to lower the cost of intermediation.  
 
4. Data, Variables, and Empirical Model 
This study aims to investigate the factors behind the persistence of high interest 
margins in Indonesian banking after the 1997/1998 financial crisis. We hypothesize that 
several factors play a role in explaining the interest margins of Indonesian banks spreading 
from the structure of loan portfolios, the degree of competition, the level of income 
diversification, cost efficiency, bank size, risk aversion, credit risk, liquidity risk and 
ownership structure. 
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 Four state-owned banks in our sample are publicly traded banks. The government, however, maintains its 
majority ownership.  
16
 Hamada (2003) shows that foreign banks’ presence in Indonesia started in 1968. However, the number of 
foreign banks was stable until the deregulation of the Indonesian banking sector in 1988 which then doubled the 
number of foreign banks.  
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4.1.  Data and Sample 
We use yearly bank-level data for the 2001–2009 period. Annual banks’ financial 
reports (balance sheets and income statements) come from Bank Indonesia and Ekofin 
Konsultindo. Data on the proportion of small scale loans and the proportion of property loans 
are reported by banks in the additional information of their financial reports. Our sample 
covers 93 commercial banks resulting in 617 bank-year observations. We end up with an 
unbalanced panel because we exclude banks exhibiting negative equity value, incomplete 
data for some variables and a number of outliers
17
.  
4.2.  Variables 
3.2.1 Dependent variable 
- Net interest margins 
The dependent variable of this study is the net interest margin (NIM) which is the 
difference between interest income and interest expenses divided by interest-earning assets.  
3.2.2 Independent variables 
- Loan portfolio 
We use two kinds of lending shares which are the proportion of small scale loans to 
total loans (SMALL) and the proportion of property (housing) loans to total loans 
(PROPERTY). A positive sign is expected for the small scale loans because these loans may 
require a higher risk premium and these loans are costly. The coefficient of property loans is 
expected to be negative as these loans are less risky. Moreover government policy could 
reduce the interest rate on these loans.  
- Market Power (Degree of competition) 
We use a Lerner index (LERNER) to measure the degree of competition as banks 
with a higher spread between price and marginal cost could be considered to have a higher 
degree of monopoly power. Banks having a greater market power are supposed to set a higher 
interest margins (Maudos and de Guevara, 2004; Maudos and Solís, 2009). Referring to 
Koetter et al. (2012), Lerner index (LERNER) is the difference between average revenues 
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 We need to eliminate banks with a negative value of equity in the computation of the Lerner index. For some 
variables, especially the non-performing loans ratio, we have some missing data. Finally, we ignore extreme 
observations (outliers) for all the variables, particularly for our dependent variable (net interest margins), which 
in total corresponds to excluding around 5% bank-year observations.   
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(AR) and marginal costs (MC) divided by average revenues (AR) which can be written as 
follow: 
LERNER = (AR – MC)/AR …………………………………………………..................... (1) 
To calculate the marginal costs, we employ a translog total cost function which 
includes three input factors (interest on total borrowed funds, labor cost, and cost of fixed 
assets), four outputs (loans, other earnings assets, total securities, and off-balance sheet 
items), total equity, and time trend. The total cost function is estimated using a stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA) following the work of Koetter et al. (2012).  
A positive sign is expected as banks having a greater market power can set a higher 
interest margin. In addition, we report the results obtained by considering the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index (HHI) instead of the Lerner index as a robustness check. 
- Diversification 
We follow the method of Elsas et al. (2010) to measure the degree of bank 
diversification (DIV). Basically, their diversification index is an adjusted Herfindahl-
Hirschman index. The index ranges from 0 (fully specialized bank) to 0.75 (bank with fully 
balanced revenue).  
The diversification index is defined as: 
DIV = [1 – [(INT/REV)2 + (COM/REV)2 + (TRAD/REV)2 + (OTHER/REV)2]] x 100 …..(2) 
where INT is the gross interest income, COM is the commission income, TRAD represents 
the trading revenue, and OTHER is other revenue. The denominator is total revenues (REV).   
 As argued above, we expect a negative sign for the coefficient of this variable because 
more diversified banks tend to set a lower interest rate (cross subsidization strategy).  
- Efficiency 
First, following the studies of Maudos and de Guevara (2004), Beck and Hesse (2009) 
and Maudos and Solís (2009), we include the ratio of operating costs to total assets 
(OVERHEAD) to represent the efficiency of the production process. The higher the operating 
costs, the higher the interest margin banks will charge. Second, the ratio of cost to gross 
income (CIR) is also employed to measure the efficiency (quality) of management following 
12 
 
Maudos and Solís (2009). This ratio reflects how much management spends to obtain a unit 
of income; therefore, a negative sign is expected for this ratio.  
- Bank size 
Bank size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets orthogonalized with 
equity (ORTHOLNTA) because of their strong correlation following the study of Barry et al. 
(2011). Large banks are expected to set a lower bank margin due to economies of scale 
enabling them to decrease their margins (Fungáčová and Poghosyan, 2011). Such banks have 
been found to grow in loan markets with low margins (López-Espinosa et al., 2011).   
- Risk aversion 
The ratio of equity to total assets (EQTA) measures the degree of risk aversion as 
proposed by Maudos and Solís (2009) and Poghosyan (2010). A higher degree of risk 
aversion is expected to be associated to a higher interest margin set by the bank.   
- Credit Risk  
We measure credit risk using the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (NPL) 
following the study of Fungáčová and Poghosyan (2011). There are two competing 
arguments regarding the relationship between credit risk and margins. On the one hand, 
banks facing higher credit risk might charge a higher risk premium on their loans (Maudos 
and de Guevara, 2004) thereby increasing interest margins. On the other hand, as argued by 
Fungáčová and Poghosyan (2011) depositors might require higher interest rates on their 
deposits because they feel that the bank is more risky and therefore interest margins could be 
lower. Hence, the expected sign for credit risk is ambiguous.  
- Liquidity Risk  
The ratio of loans to deposits stands for bank liquidity risk (LDR). The higher this 
ratio, the higher the liquidity risk and the lower the bank holds reserves. As argued by López-
Espinosa et al. (2011), a higher level of liquid assets would decrease net interest margins. We 
therefore expect a positive sign for the coefficient of LDR.  
- State-owned banks 
As explained above, state-owned banks in Indonesia consist of central government-
owned banks and regional development banks. We use a dummy variable (SOB) to identify 
13 
 
the state-owned banks. These banks are expected to charge a lower rate for deposits because 
they are perceived as less risky by depositors. Moreover, the development roles of these 
banks may lead them to be more costly. Therefore a positive sign is expected.  
- Foreign banks  
Foreign banks (FOB) in Indonesia consist of branches of foreign banks, subsidiaries 
of foreign banks, and joint venture banks (Hadad et al., 2011). We use a dummy variable 
(FOB) to categorize foreign banks. Benefiting from better hard information and technology 
may lead these banks to perform more efficiently than domestic banks. Accordingly, a 
negative sign is expected.  
 
3.2.3 Control variables 
- Listed banks 
Publicly traded banks are supposed to have a better monitoring and efficiency. 
Therefore, we incorporate a dummy variable for listed banks (LISTED) as a control variable. 
- Year dummies  
We include year dummies (YEARS) in all of our regressions to capture time effects 
which could matter because of time-variant macroeconomic factors as argued by Beck and 
Hesse (2009).    
 
4.3.  Empirical Model 
To deal with multicolinearity issues, we orthogonalize the proxy of size which is the 
natural log of total assets with equity. Moreover, because our bank diversification variable is 
highly correlated with the variable capturing small scale loans as well as bank size, we do not 
introduce the diversification variable concomitantly to these two variables. Likewise, we do 
not introduce bank size concurrently with operating costs and the cost to income ratio due to 
their high correlations.    
The specifications of the determinants of interest margins to be estimated are 
formulated as follows:  
 
NIMi,t = α0 + α1SMALLi,t + α2PROPERTYi,t + α3LERNERi,t + α4OVERHEADi,t + α5CIRi,t + 
α6EQTAi,t + α7NPLi,t +  α8LDRi,t +  α9SOBi + α10FOBi + α11LISTEDi,t + YEARS + εi,t 
……………………………………………………………………………………………….. (3)     
14 
 
NIMi,t = α0 + α1SMALLi,t + α2PROPERTYi,t + α3LERNERi,t + α4ORTHOLNTAi,t + α5EQTAi,t 
+ α6NPLi,t +  α7LDRi,t +  α8SOBi + α9FOBi + α10LISTEDi,t + YEARS + εi,t 
……………………………......................................................................................... (4)        
NIMi,t = α0 + α1PROPERTYi,t + α2LERNERi,t + α3DIVi,t + α4OVERHEADi,t + α5CIRi,t + 
α6EQTAi,t + α7NPLi,t +  α8LDRi,t +  α9SOBi + α10FOBi + α11LISTEDi,t + YEARS + εi,t 
……………………………………………………………………………………………….. (5)     
where i, t represent bank and time, respectively. NIM is the net interest margin. SMALL and 
PROPERTY are the proportion of small scale loans to total loans and the proportion of 
property (housing) loans to total loans, respectively. LERNER is the Lerner index. DIV is the 
bank diversification index. OVERHEAD is the ratio of operating costs to total assets, while 
CIR denotes the cost to income ratio. ORTHOLNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets 
orthogonalized with equity. EQTA is the ratio of equity to total assets. NPL is the ratio of 
non-performing loans to total loans. LDR stands for the loans to deposits ratio. SOB is a 
dummy taking value 1 for state-owned banks. FOB is a dummy taking value 1 for foreign-
banks. LISTED is a dummy taking value 1 for publicly traded banks. YEARS represents a 
vector of year (time) dummies. We estimate the empirical model in equation 3 using pooled 
and static panel regressions. 
Carbó and Rodriguez (2007), and Maudos and Solís (2009) consider that bank interest 
margins is influenced by their previous values given the fact that banks have to match across 
periods the deposits and lending which are randomly determined as well as non-interest 
activities. Therefore, they argue that the determination of interest margins should also be 
tested using a dynamic panel method. Hence, we also estimate a dynamic panel data model 
employing a two-step Generalized Method of Moments/ GMM estimator
18
. The equations 
can be written as follows:  
NIMi,t = α0 + α1NIMi,t-1 + α2SMALLi,t + α3PROPERTYi,t + α4LERNERi,t + α5OVERHEADi,t + 
α6CIRi,t + α7EQTAi,t + α8NPLi,t +  α9LDRi,t +  α10SOBi + α11FOBi + α12LISTEDi,t + 
YEARS + εi,t …………………………….................................................................... (6)       
NIMi,t = α0 + α1NIMi,t-1 + α2SMALLi,t + α3PROPERTYi,t + α4LERNERi,t + α5ORTHOLNTAi,t 
+ α6EQTAi,t + α7NPLi,t +  α8LDRi,t +  α9SOBi + α10FOBi + α11LISTEDi,t + YEARS 
+ εi,t ……………………………................................................................................ (7)        
                                                             
18
 We use a two-step GMM estimator, particularly the System GMM proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998) which extends the standard GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991). The System 
GMM estimator uses both first-differences and levels. 
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NIMi,t = α0 + α1NIMi,t-1 + α2PROPERTYi,t + α3LERNERi,t + α4DIVi,t + α5OVERHEADi,t + 
α6CIRi,t + α7EQTAi,t + α8NPLi,t +  α9LDRi,t +  α10SOBi + α11FOBi + α12LISTEDi,t + 
YEARS + εi,t …………………………….................................................................... (8)     
   
5. Results 
5.1.  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables of our full sample and the 
sub-samples by ownership type (state-owned banks, foreign banks, and private-domestic 
banks), while table 2 reports the statistics year by year. The dependent variable (NIM) has a 
mean (median) of 6.61% (5.91%). As shown in table 2, the yearly average interest margins of 
Indonesian banks are persistently high during the period we study. The means (medians) of 
the proportion of small scale loans and the proportion of property loans are 16.33% (7.78%) 
and 4.98% (0.77%) respectively. The mean (median) of Lerner index is 0.393 (0.369), while 
the average (median) of the diversification index is 16.61% (11.51%). The ratio of overhead 
costs to total assets has an average (median) of 3.73% (3.61%), whereas the cost to income 
ratio has a mean (median) of 79.48% (80.25%). The average size (total assets) is 20,593.86 
billion Rupiah. The smallest bank has assets of 52.65 billion Rupiah, while 370,000 billion 
Rupiah is the total assets of the largest bank. 11.76% (9.73%) is the average (median) of the 
ratio of equity to total assets. The mean (median) of the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans is 4% (2.8%). The average (median) of the loans to deposits ratio in our sample is 
74.18% (69.78%).   
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
-----------------------------  
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 here 
-----------------------------  
5.2.  Correlation Matrix 
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix between variables of this study. The correlations 
between the dependent variable (interest margin) and the explanatory variables are shown in 
the first column of the table. As expected, net interest margins (NIM) is found to be 
positively correlated with small scale loans, the Lerner index, the ratio of overhead costs to 
total assets, and the ratio of equity to total assets. We observe, as expected, negative 
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correlations between NIM and property loans, diversification, the cost to income ratio, as 
well as between NIM and size. The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans and the loans 
to deposits ratio are found to be negatively correlated with NIM.  
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 here 
-----------------------------  
 
5.3. Regressions 
We analyze the determinants of interest margins of Indonesian banks by employing 
pooled regression and static panel regression techniques, as well as a two-step GMM 
estimator. Table 4 presents the regression results of pooled regression (column 1, 2 and 3), 
random effect panel data (column 4, 5 and 6), and two-step GMM estimation (column 7, 8 
and 9). The Wald test, the Sargan test, and the Arellano-Bond test (autocorrelation) of the 
GMM estimation meet the requirements. The Wald test in the random effect model is found 
to satisfy the requirement as well.  
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 here 
-----------------------------  
As expected, we find a positive and significant impact of small scale loans (SMALL) 
on interest margins (NIM) in all models. Banks with a greater proportion of small scale loans 
in their loan portfolio set a higher interest margin. In the pooled regression, the ratio of 
property loans to total loans (PROPERTY), as expected, has a negative effect on interest 
margins. However, the coefficient of this variable is not significant in the random effect panel 
data and GMM estimations. In line with Beck and Hesse (2009), the results suggest that the 
structure of bank loan portfolios matters in the determination of interest margins. Banks set a 
higher interest margin if they are more exposed to riskier loans.  
As shown in all models, we confirm the findings of Maudos and de Guevara (2004), 
and Maudos and Solís (2009) that market power, measured by Lerner index (LERNER), is 
positively associated with interest margins. Banks set a higher interest margins when they 
face relatively inelastic demand and supply functions in the markets enabling them to 
exercise their monopoly power (Ho and Saunders, 1981).  
Our results is consistent with the loss leader hypothesis on the cross-subsidization 
strategy of income diversification (Lepetit et al., 2008; Maudos and Solís, 2009), as shown by 
the negative coefficients of the diversification index (DIV) in all regression models. More 
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diversified banks charge a lower interest rate as they are able to gain a higher income from 
non-interest activities because the lower rate might attract new clients to the banks. Such 
clients are expected to buy fee generating services from the bank. Subsequently, more 
diversified banks have a lower interest margin.  
We find that the ratio of overhead costs to total assets (OVERHEAD) is positively and 
significantly associated with interest margins using all methods. These results confirm the 
findings of Beck and Hesse (2009) and Maudos and Solís (2009) as well as the extension of 
the dealership model proposed by Maudos and de Guevara (2004) which includes operating 
costs to represent how efficient banks are in their production process. As expected, the 
second proxy of efficiency which is the cost to income ratio (CIR) has a negative impact on 
interest margins using all methods. This result confirms the finding of Maudos and de 
Guevara (2004), Maudos and Solís (2009) and Lopez-Espinosa et al. (2011).  
Strong evidence is also found regarding the negative effect of bank size, measured by 
the natural logarithm of total assets orthogonalized with equity (ORTHOLNTA) on interest 
margins. This negative impact confirms the hypothesis that large banks achieve economies of 
scale that can decrease their margins (Beck and Hesse, 2009; Fungáčová and Poghosyan, 
2011). The ratio of equity to total assets (EQTA) which is a proxy of risk aversion has a 
positive and significant coefficient in all the regressions. In line with the dealership model 
(Ho and Saunders, 1981) higher managerial risk aversion will increase interest margins. This 
result is similar to those of previous studies such as Maudos and Solís (2009), Poghosyan 
(2010).  
Our results show that credit risk, measured by the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans (NPL), has a negative and significant effect on interest margins in the pooled and 
random effect regression models which confirm the finding of Fungáčová and Poghosyan 
(2011). The results are also in line with the findings of Hadad et al., (2011) that in Indonesia 
market discipline by depositors is pronounced in the price of deposits. Depositors require a 
higher interest rate on deposits for riskier banks. The loans to deposits ratio (LDR) as the 
proxy of liquidity risk has a positive impact on bank margins using all regression methods. 
The results are consistent with the findings of Maudos and de Guevara (2004), López-
Espinosa et al. (2011), Chen and Liao (2011). More liquid banks (banks with lower liquidity 
risk) with higher opportunity cost have lower interest margins.   
Regarding the influence of bank ownership, in all our models, the coefficient of the 
dummy for state-owned banks (SOB) exhibits a positive and significant sign. The results 
show that state-owned banks set a higher interest margin than other banks. There are a 
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number of possible explanations for such a result. First, as they are perceived less risky by 
depositors because of implicit guarantee and too-big-to-fail considerations, specifically by a 
large number of small depositors, they can easily obtain resources under the form deposits 
with a lower cost than other funds. Second, as explained by Rosengard and Prasetyantoko 
(2011), the higher interest margins of Indonesian state-owned banks (both provincial and 
central) are mainly driven inefficiency considerations. Third, labor surplus in these banks 
may contribute to increase the operating costs which subsequently lead them to increase their 
margins.   
The coefficient of the dummy for foreign banks (FOB) is found to be negative and 
significant in all models. The results are consistent with those of previous studies such as 
Martinez-Peria and Mody (2004) in which foreign banks are found to charge a lower interest 
margin than domestic banks. This evidence may result from the better hard information and 
technology from which foreign banks benefit which in turn enables them to perform more 
efficiently than domestic banks.  
Finally, we find little evidence on the difference regarding interest margins between 
listed (LISTED) and non-listed banks in all models.  
 
5.4. Robustness Checks  
We conduct several robustness checks. Firstly, we follow the method of Maudos and de 
Guevarra (2004) by replacing the Lerner index by the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI), 
calculated on the basis of total assets, as a measure of banking market structure. As expected, 
the coefficient of HHI is positive and significant in some models, while the results for the 
other variables are stable (the results are presented in table 5).   
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 here 
-----------------------------  
Secondly, we exclude the dummy for state-owned banks (SOB), the dummy for foreign 
banks (FOB), and the dummy for listed banks (LISTED) to enable us to test the empirical 
model using fixed-effect panel data techniques. For all the remaining variables, except for the 
Lerner index, the results are similar to those of the random effect regressions presented in 
column 4 - 6 of table 4 although the effect of the Lerner index is slightly weaker but still 
significant.  
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6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
We analyze the determinants of net interest margins in Indonesia after the 1997/1998 
financial crisis. We use data of 93 commercial banks over the 2001-2009 period. We estimate 
the empirical model using pooled regression techniques as well as static and dynamic panel 
methods.  
We confirm that the structure of loan portfolio matters in the determination of interest 
margins. In the context of Indonesian banking, small scale loans contribute to increase bank 
margins, whereas housing (property) loans reduce interest margins. Our results also show that 
Indonesian banks with a greater market power set higher interest margins. Furthermore, we 
also corroborate the loss leader hypothesis on cross-subsidization of lending and non-interest 
activities. The results also validate that higher margins are driven by higher operating costs, 
higher risk aversion and higher liquidity risk. Consistent with previous literature the cost to 
income ratio is also found to negatively affect intermediation margins. We also find that 
credit risk has a negative impact on bank margins. Strong evidence is found that large banks 
set lower interest margins.   
We then turn our analysis to the role of ownership as a determinant of interest margins. 
Considering whether there is a difference in interest margins between state-owned 
(government) banks and private banks, we find that the latter have lower margins. Our 
findings also confirm that foreign banks are beneficial to the banking sector and the economy 
as a whole as they charge lower margins.  
These empirical results have several noteworthy policy implications. Firstly, we show 
that banks with a higher market power “enjoy” higher interest margins. Therefore, promoting 
a more healthy banking competition should be pursued by regulators to specifically improve 
transparency and disclosure on banking products. Secondly, the regulation on the 
transparency of the prime lending rate has been released by the Bank Indonesia in March 
2011 but only for corporate, retail, housing and consumption loans. Extending the regulation 
on prime lending rates to include loans to MSMEs should be strongly recommended. Thirdly, 
the positive impact of small scale loans on interest margins may come from the fact that loans 
to micro, small and medium enterprises require a higher risk premium. Imposing on banks 
that they charge a lower rate on these loans may not be a proper answer as these loans are 
costly and riskier. Regulators should therefore direct banks to appropriately estimate risk 
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premia on loans to MSMEs, for instance by using credit scoring systems.  Lastly, Regulators 
need to bring banks to perform more efficiently.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics – based on ownership type 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of our variables. NIM is the net interest margins (%). SMALL is the proportion of small scale loans to total loans (%). PROPERTY is the 
proportion of property loans to total loans (%). LERNER is the Lerner index. DIV is the diversification index (%). OVERHEAD is the ratio of operating costs to total assets (%). CIR is 
the cost to income ratio (%). ASSET denotes total assets in billion Rupiah. EQTA is the ratio of equity to total assets (%). NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (%). LDR 
represents the loans to deposits ratio (%).  
Sample Banks Statistics NIM SMALL PROPERTY LERNER DIV OVERHEAD CIR 
ASSETS 
(billion 
Rupiah) 
EQTA NPL LDR 
Full Sample 617  Mean 6.693 16.697 5.037 0.391 16.068 3.700 79.205 21003.25 11.760 3.999 74.181 
  
 Median 5.980 8.030 0.786 0.366 11.301 3.616 80.144 4070.27 9.729 2.800 69.781 
  
 Maximum 16.640 100.000 53.610 2.208 57.349 16.729 219.940 370000 51.069 44.000 313.446 
  
 Minimum -0.650 0.000 0.000 -7.930 0.864 0.195 21.850 52.65 0.466 0.010 5.104 
  
 Std. Dev. 3.046 22.039 8.722 0.507 12.609 1.668 18.846 49010.14 7.348 4.519 38.775 
  
 Skewness 0.828 1.971 2.771 -7.020 1.324 1.319 1.710 4.08189 1.940 3.443 2.133 
              State-owned  207  Mean 9.109 31.901 4.568 0.535 10.299 4.265 76.575 32029.3 9.077 3.165 60.772 
Banks 
 
 Median 9.230 21.370 0.328 0.547 8.392 4.403 76.570 4566.6 8.656 2.010 56.458 
  
 Maximum 16.640 100.000 53.610 0.995 31.043 7.589 108.290 370000 19.274 26.660 129.593 
  
 Minimum 0.900 0.000 0.000 -0.075 2.573 0.958 38.920 208.62 3.133 0.090 10.037 
  
 Std. Dev. 3.097 27.435 10.700 0.260 5.973 1.456 9.561 71330.99 3.137 3.433 25.996 
  
 Skewness 0.095 1.091 3.302 -0.140 1.347 -0.091 -0.370 2.836817 0.833 3.189 0.341 
              Foreign Banks 127  Mean 4.741 0.302 1.129 0.484 33.237 2.711 65.700 10907.23 15.216 5.948 111.844 
  
 Median 4.390 0.000 0.000 0.507 35.386 2.509 63.620 5509.92 14.520 4.090 98.983 
  
 Maximum 10.000 13.000 19.765 1.991 57.349 8.537 219.000 52329.46 40.872 44.000 313.446 
  
 Minimum 1.470 0.000 0.000 -0.997 6.865 0.195 21.850 410.01 0.466 0.100 22.466 
  
 Std. Dev. 1.653 1.462 3.046 0.468 13.682 1.507 24.910 11548.69 9.013 6.132 57.073 
  
 Skewness 0.824 6.582 4.058 -0.435 -0.250 0.862 2.318 1.546831 0.211 2.766 1.365 
Private 
Domestic 283  Mean 5.802 12.933 7.134 0.243 12.583 3.730 87.190 17468.99 12.170 3.735 67.087 
Banks 
 
 Median 5.570 7.310 4.869 0.187 10.124 3.529 86.930 2403.2 9.866 2.750 68.753 
  
 Maximum 15.100 81.130 41.081 2.208 43.298 16.729 219.940 281000 51.069 29.020 152.650 
  
 Minimum -0.650 0.010 0.000 -7.930 0.864 1.012 34.450 52.65 1.301 0.010 5.104 
  
 Std. Dev. 2.291 14.328 8.181 0.611 8.259 1.683 16.752 36370.19 7.976 4.113 22.667 
     Skewness 0.957 2.167 1.422 -8.159 1.118 2.662 3.180 3.953469 2.350 3.597 -0.128 
24 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics year by year 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of our variables. NIM is the net interest margins (%). SMALL is the proportion of small scale loans to total loans (%). 
PROPERTY is the proportion of property loans to total loans (%). LERNER is the Lerner index. DIV is the diversification index (%). OVERHEAD is the ratio of operating 
costs to total assets (%). CIR is the cost to income ratio (%). ASSET denotes total assets in billion Rupiah. EQTA is the ratio of equity to total assets (%). NPL is the ratio of 
non-performing loans to total loans (%). LDR represents the loans to deposits ratio (%).  
Year Banks Statistics NIM SMALL PROPERTY LERNER DIV OVERHEAD CIR 
ASSETS 
(billion 
Rupiah) 
EQTA NPL LDR 
2001 59  Mean 6.617 28.156 2.308 0.322 12.699 3.178 82.269 14721.88 9.432 6.749 54.147 
  
 Std. Dev. 3.500 31.972 4.669 1.160 11.133 1.365 26.150 40384.47 7.061 8.110 31.037 
              
2002 62  Mean 6.626 21.776 2.993 0.488 14.619 3.675 82.543 14935.41 11.186 5.475 64.823 
  
 Std. Dev. 3.461 25.206 5.846 0.375 12.450 1.700 26.432 38919.5 7.076 6.136 38.392 
              
2003 67  Mean 6.600 21.824 3.823 0.394 16.328 3.633 78.626 15064.21 11.647 4.375 67.826 
  
 Std. Dev. 3.127 25.373 7.322 0.428 14.029 1.737 19.116 38450.43 6.892 4.720 37.177 
              
2004 70  Mean 7.040 17.664 4.954 0.476 19.945 3.826 75.402 16146.19 11.253 4.095 73.471 
  
 Std. Dev. 3.541 20.592 8.916 0.353 15.554 2.247 22.221 38578.98 5.738 4.181 40.784 
              
2005 76  Mean 6.931 14.949 4.983 0.392 15.929 3.889 78.967 17700.96 11.485 3.977 77.036 
  
 Std. Dev. 3.217 19.566 8.979 0.445 11.980 1.543 16.369 39669.33 7.210 3.782 39.823 
              
2006 73  Mean 6.801 13.384 5.993 0.386 14.341 3.805 79.703 20858.44 11.187 3.577 72.277 
  
 Std. Dev. 3.017 16.527 9.762 0.346 10.974 1.963 15.301 44155.58 6.173 2.940 41.036 
              
2007 75  Mean 6.299 12.127 5.289 0.381 16.757 3.547 78.751 23850.96 13.842 2.794 81.201 
  
 Std. Dev. 2.545 17.074 9.066 0.359 11.710 1.425 14.082 52646.65 10.008 2.169 42.054 
              
2008 67  Mean 6.792 12.143 7.118 0.344 16.713 3.845 78.874 30890.52 12.369 2.565 86.478 
  
 Std. Dev. 2.683 18.442 10.231 0.356 12.706 1.412 13.608 62775.35 7.376 2.215 29.757 
              
2009 68  Mean 6.510 11.112 7.257 0.330 16.680 3.813 78.550 33800.89 12.959 3.018 86.085 
     Std. Dev. 2.287 17.161 10.289 0.339 11.721 1.329 13.449 71343.04 7.146 2.756 36.378 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the pairwise correlation between the variables used in this study. NIM is the net interest margins (%). SMALL is the proportion of small scale loans to 
total loans (%). PROPERTY is the proportion of property loans to total loans (%). LERNER is the Lerner index. DIV is the diversification index (%). OVERHEAD is the 
ratio of operating costs to total assets (%). CIR is the cost to income ratio (%). ORTHOLNTA denotes the natural logarithm of total assets orthogonalized with equity. 
EQTA is the ratio of equity to total assets (%). NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (%). LDR represents the loans to deposits ratio (%). 
  NIM SMALL PROPERTY LERNER DIV OVERHEAD CIR ORTHOLNTA EQTA NPL LDR 
NIM 1 
          SMALL 0.384 1 
         PROPERTY -0.165 -0.025 1 
        LERNER 0.192 0.069 -0.082 1 
       DIV -0.400 -0.378 -0.059 0.122 1 
      OVERHEAD 0.339 0.178 -0.053 -0.032 -0.081 1 
     CIR -0.158 0.108 0.055 -0.207 -0.116 0.176 1 
    ORTHOLNTA -0.182 -0.276 0.200 0.137 0.359 -0.331 -0.318 1 
   EQTA 0.124 -0.081 -0.086 -0.014 -0.085 0.005 -0.196 0.000 1 
  NPL -0.251 -0.082 -0.044 0.044 0.274 -0.023 0.226 -0.003 0.007 1 
 LDR -0.035 -0.222 -0.071 -0.034 0.138 -0.011 -0.057 0.100 0.302 0.068 1 
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Table 4: Regressions results 
This table presents the results of pooled regression (column 1, 2 and 3), random effect panel data (column 4, 5 and 6), and two-step GMM estimation (column 7, 8 and 9). The dependent 
variable is net interest margins (NIM, presenting in percentage). SMALL is the proportion of small scale loans to total loans (%). PROPERTY is the proportion of property loans to total loans 
(%). LERNER is the Lerner index. DIV is the diversification index (%). OVERHEAD is the ratio of operating costs to total assets (%). CIR is the cost to income ratio (%). ORTHOLNTA 
denotes the natural logarithm of total assets orthogonalized with equity. EQTA is the ratio of equity to total assets (%). NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (%). LDR 
represents the loans to deposits ratio (%). SOB is the dummy variable for state-owned banks. FOB represents the dummy variable for foreign banks. LISTED is the dummy variable for 
publicly traded banks. The values in parentheses are standard errors. ∗, ∗∗ and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
  Dependent Variable: Net Interest Margin (NIM) 
  Pooled Random Effect GMM 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
NIM (t-1) 
      
0.378*** 0.419*** 0.387*** 
 
      
(0.030) (0.042) (0.030) 
SMALL 0.010** 0.008* 
 
0.013*** 0.010** 
 
0.009** 0.007 
 
 
(0.004) (0.005) 
 
(0.004) (0.005) 
 
(0.004) (0.005) 
 PROPERTY -0.038*** -0.041*** -0.035*** -0.014 0.003 -0.013 -0.002 0.013 -0.001 
 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) 
LERNER 0.555*** 0.858*** 0.611*** 0.284** 0.260** 0.298** 0.401** 0.549*** 0.445** 
 
(0.149) (0.182) (0.146) (0.124) (0.131) (0.123) (0.168) (0.202) (0.174) 
DIV 
  
-0.050*** 
  
-0.047*** 
  
-0.017** 
   
(0.009) 
  
(0.010) 
  
(0.008) 
OVERHEAD 0.839*** 
 
0.861*** 0.554*** 
 
0.580*** 0.379*** 
 
0.378*** 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.047) (0.051) 
 
(0.050) (0.070) 
 
(0.072) 
CIR -0.049*** 
 
-0.054*** -0.035*** 
 
-0.038*** -0.026*** 
 
-0.027*** 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.005) (0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
ORTHOLNTA 
 
-0.268*** 
  
-0.485*** 
  
-0.412** 
 
  
(0.075) 
  
(0.120) 
  
(0.204) 
 EQTA 0.059*** 0.095*** 0.050*** 0.069*** 0.112*** 0.068*** 0.060*** 0.090*** 0.062*** 
 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) 
NPL -0.053*** -0.113*** -0.030 -0.042** -0.078*** -0.027 -0.027** -0.059*** -0.021 
 
(0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) 
LDR 0.004* 0.006** 0.002 0.005** 0.006** 0.004* 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
SOB 2.004*** 3.167*** 2.065*** 2.631*** 3.865*** 2.754*** 0.883*** 1.677*** 0.999*** 
 
(0.205) (0.259) (0.191) (0.361) (0.473) (0.335) (0.309) (0.342) (0.294) 
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Table 4. (Continued) 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
FOB -1.799*** -1.547*** -0.808** -1.596*** -0.901* -0.762* -1.517*** -0.200 -1.112** 
 
(0.269) (0.334) (0.323) (0.416) (0.334) (0.443) (0.486) (0.670) (0.529) 
LISTED -0.178 -0.058 0.086 -0.038 0.361 0.088 -0.436** 0.008 -0.341 
  (0.207) (0.306) (0.209) (0.284) (0.344) (0.279) (0.215) (0.258) (0.218) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Method Pooled Pooled Pooled 
Panel 
(Random 
effect/GLS) 
Panel 
(Random 
effect/GLS) 
Panel 
(Random 
effect/GLS) 
GMM GMM GMM 
Observations 617 617 617 617 617 617 554 554 554 
Overall R-squared 0.678 0.510 0.692 0.647 0.478 0.663 
   R-Squared between 
   
0.728 0.560 0.752 
   R-Squared within 
   
0.271 0.171 0.281 
   
Wald Test 
   
chi2(19)= 
462.59 
(0.000)*** 
chi2(18)= 
227.40 
(0.000)*** 
chi2(19)=  
513.87 
(0.000)*** 
chi2(19)= 
881.34 
(0.000)*** 
chi2(18)= 
842.04 
(0.000)*** 
chi2(19)= 
953.44 
(0.000)*** 
Sargan Test 
      
chi2(32)=  
38.45 (0.201) 
chi2(32)=  
38.45 (0.201) 
chi2(32)=  
39.08 (0.181) 
Arellano–Bond test 
for AR(1)       
N(0, 1)=   
-3.341 
(0.001)*** 
N(0, 1)=  
-3.495 
(0.000)*** 
N(0, 1)=  
-3.376 
(0.001)*** 
Arellano–Bond test 
for AR(2) 
            
N(0, 1)=   
-0.029 
(0.977) 
N(0, 1)=   
-0.902 
(0.367) 
N(0, 1)=   
-0.030 
(0.976) 
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Table 5: Robustness Check – alternative measure of market structure 
This table presents the results of pooled regression (column 1, 2 and 3), random effect panel data (column 4, 5 and 6), and two-step GMM estimation (column 7, 8 and 9). The dependent 
variable is net interest margins (NIM, presenting in percentage). SMALL is the proportion of small scale loans to total loans (%). PROPERTY is the proportion of property loans to total loans 
(%). HHI is the Herfindahl Hirschman Index. DIV is the diversification index (%). OVERHEAD is the ratio of operating costs to total assets (%). CIR is the cost to income ratio (%). 
ORTHOLNTA denotes the natural logarithm of total assets orthogonalized with equity. EQTA is the ratio of equity to total assets (%). NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 
(%). LDR represents the loans to deposits ratio (%). SOB is the dummy variable for state-owned banks. FOB represents the dummy variable for foreign banks. LISTED is the dummy variable 
for publicly traded banks. The values in parentheses are standard errors. ∗, ∗∗ and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
  Dependent Variable: Net Interest Margin (NIM) 
  Pooled Random Effect GMM 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
NIM (t-1) 
      
0.407*** 0.449*** 0.419*** 
 
      
(0.030) (0.040) (0.031) 
SMALL 0.010** 0.009* 
 
0.013*** 0.010** 
 
0.008* 0.007 
 
 
(0.004) (0.005) 
 
(0.004) (0.005) 
 
(0.004) (0.005) 
 PROPERTY -0.039*** -0.044*** -0.037*** -0.015 0.004 -0.013 -0.001 0.016 -0.001 
 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
HHI 0.114 -0.021 0.097 0.172** -0.012 0.181** 0.092* -0.021 0.114** 
 
(0.078) (0.097) (0.076) (0.070) (0.082) (0.068) (0.049) (0.066) (0.049) 
DIV 
  
-0.048*** 
  
-0.047*** 
  
-0.014* 
   
(0.009) 
  
(0.010) 
  
(0.008) 
OVERHEAD 0.844*** 
 
0.866*** 0.549*** 
 
0.571*** 0.367*** 
 
0.358*** 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.048) (0.051) 
 
(0.051) (0.068) 
 
(0.070) 
CIR -0.053*** 
 
-0.058*** -0.035*** 
 
-0.039*** -0.028*** 
 
-0.029*** 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.005) (0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
ORTHOLNTA 
 
-0.222*** 
  
-0.501*** 
  
-0.338* 
 
  
(0.076) 
  
(0.125) 
  
(0.200) 
 EQTA 0.056*** 0.094*** 0.047*** 0.070*** 0.114*** 0.069*** 0.061*** 0.092*** 0.065*** 
 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) 
NPL -0.045** -0.109*** -0.022 -0.038** -0.075*** -0.023 -0.028** -0.064*** -0.023* 
 
(0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.019) (0.013) 
LDR 0.004* 0.007** 0.002 0.004* 0.005* 0.003 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
SOB 2.118*** 3.355*** 2.203*** 2.705*** 3.963*** 2.844*** 1.037*** 1.893*** 1.177*** 
 
(0.205) (0.261) (0.191) (0.361) (0.500) (0.341) (0.297) (0.343) (0.283) 
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Table 5. (Continued) 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
FOB -1.738*** -1.435*** -0.791** -1.557*** -0.817 -0.723* -1.327*** -0.193 -1.028* 
 
(0.271) (0.339) (0.328) (0.418) (0.558) (0.450) (0.500) (0.631) (0.542) 
LISTED -0.154 -0.119 0.095 -0.040 0.373 0.089 -0.336 0.089 -0.256 
  (0.210) (0.311) (0.212) (0.286) (0.346) (0.282) (0.209) (0.245) (0.213) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Method Pooled Pooled Pooled 
Panel 
(Random 
effect/GLS) 
Panel 
(Random 
effect/GLS) 
Panel 
(Random 
effect/GLS) 
GMM GMM GMM 
Observations 617 617 617 617 617 617 554 554 554 
Overall R-squared 0.670 0.491 0.683 0.639 0.466 0.663 
   R-Squared between 
   
0.73 0.546 0.752 
   R-Squared within 
   
0.266 0.170 0.281 
   
Wald Test 
   
chi2(18)= 
452.75 
(0.000)*** 
chi2(17)= 
210.67 
(0.000)*** 
chi2(18)=  
493.07 
(0.000)*** 
chi2(18)= 
897.39 
(0.000)*** 
chi2(17)= 
734.27 
(0.000)*** 
chi2(18)= 
950.37 
(0.000)*** 
Sargan Test 
      
chi2(32)= 
40.10 (0.154) 
chi2(32)=  
40.51 (0.144) 
chi2(32)=  
41.23 (0.127) 
Arellano–Bond test 
for AR(1)       
N(0, 1)=   
-3.327 
(0.001)*** 
N(0, 1)=  
-3.497 
(0.000)*** 
N(0, 1)=  
-3.392 
(0.001)*** 
Arellano–Bond test 
for AR(2) 
            
N(0, 1)=   
-0.067 
(0.947) 
N(0, 1)=  -
1.006 (0.314) 
N(0, 1)=   
-0.071 
(0.943) 
 
